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A
mAbstract
Over the last 25 years, the Social Security Disability Insurance Program (DI) has grown
dramatically. During the same period, employment rates for men with work limitations
showed substantial declines in both absolute and relative terms. While the timing of
these trends suggests that the expansion of DI was a major contributor to employment
decline among this group, raising questions about the targeting of disability benefits,
studies using denied applicants suggest a more modest role of the DI expansion. To
reconcile these findings, we decompose total employment changes into population
and employment changes for three categories: DI beneficiaries, denied applicants,
and non-applicants. Our results show that during the early 1990s, the growth in DI
can fully explain the employment decline for men only under an extreme assumption
about the employment potential of beneficiaries. For the period after the mid-1990s,
we find little role for the DI program in explaining the continuing employment
decline for men with work limitations.
JEL codes: I3, J2
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Over the last 25 years, the Social Security Disability Insurance Program (DI) has grown
dramatically. In 1985, 2.2 percent of individuals between the ages of 25 and 64 were
receiving DI benefits. By 2008, just before the great recession, this fraction had more
than doubled to 4.6 percent. A significant share of this increase can be accounted
for by the growing work force attachment of women. However, even among men, DI
participation grew rapidly over the period, rising from 3.1 to 4.8 percent of 25 to
64 year-old men.
Congressional reforms that made it substantially easier for those suffering from severe
pain or depression to obtain benefits, together with increases in the effective after-tax
replacement rate, plausibly contributed significantly to both DI participation increases and
the downward shift in the age distribution of benefits (Rupp & Stapleton, 1995; Autor &
Duggan, 2006) – two phenomena raising concern that many receiving DI benefits may in
fact be capable of work. This concern was fueled during the 1990s and 2000s when employ-
ment rates for working-aged men remained constant but declined for men with work limi-
tations, as shown in Figure 1. Other researchers have found similar patterns using other
sources of data (Burkhauser et al. 2002; Burkhauser et al. 2003)1.Bound et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any


















Figure 1 Employment rates for men, age 25-61, who indicate a work limitation, 1989-2012.
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growth in DI participation may account for much, if not all of the employment
decline of men with work limitations2. At both the national and the state level,
Bound and Waidmann (2002) regress the fraction of men out of work with health
impairments on the fraction receiving DI, and Autor and Duggan (2003) estimate
similar cross-state regressions for the period 1978 to 1998 for high-school drop-
outs, who represent a disparate share of those with DI benefits. In both studies,
the increase in DI participation appears to have had a major negative effect on
employment of men with the highest probability of applying for and receiving DI
benefits.
In contrast to these analyses, studies using rejected disability insurance applicants to
measure the labor market potential of DI beneficiaries have found that rejected appli-
cants have low earnings and employment rates. Bound (1989) analyzes two samples of
denied applicants from the 1970s. Arguing that rejected applicants should be more cap-
able of work than are beneficiaries, he posits that their employment rate can be thought
of as an upper bound estimate of how much beneficiaries would work had they not
applied for DI. He finds an employment rate for denied male applicants of no more
than 50 percent. These results have been replicated for the same age category of men
(45 years and older) by von Wachter et al. (2011), who use administrative records
spanning the period 1978 to 2004. Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) find similar results
using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) covering the
1990s. They exploit a discontinuity in the determination process to estimate the disin-
centive effect for a subgroup of applicants whose determination is based on vocational
factors3. They estimate that the employment rate of these DI beneficiaries would have
been only 20 percent higher had they not received benefits. Finally, Maestas et al.
(2013) use administrative data on variation in disability determination examiners’ allow-
ance rates to identify the employment prospects for marginal DI awardees. They find
that the employment rate for members of this group would have been 28 percentage
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generally interpreted as evidence that the increased availability and generosity of DI
benefits have had, at most, a moderate effect on the employment rates of people with
work limitations.
Each of the two approaches for estimating the impact of DI participation on employ-
ment involves making assumptions that are open to some question. On the one side,
Bound and Waidmann (2002) and Autor and Duggan (2003) observe only ecological
correlations. It is possible, though, that men with work limitations found it increasingly
difficult to work during the time period and that the DI program drew from a popula-
tion with relatively low employment rates. If this were the case, the approach used by
these two studies would overstate the negative effect of the increase in the availability
of DI benefits on the employment of men.
On the other side, Bound (1989), Chen and van der Klaauw (2008), von Wachter
et al. (2011), and Maestas et al. (2013) estimate the counterfactual employment rate
of beneficiaries assuming the application process itself does not substantially reduce
employment for denied applicants. The plausibility of this presumption is open
to question (see the interchange between Parsons (1991) and Bound (1991) for a
discussion of this issue). The application process effectively requires applicants to
remain out of work between their application and the decision on DI benefits. While
initial decisions occur within 3 or 4 months, rejected applicants who appeal deci-
sions typically wait several years before a final decision is made, and evidence sug-
gests that these delays lower reemployment prospects (Autor et al. 2011). More
important, denied applicants who plan to appeal their rejection or to reapply later
are likely to remain out of work for strategic reasons (French and Song, 2012). While
the number of denied applicants who appeal was relatively small early in the history
of DI, currently about half of those initially denied mount appeals (Autor and
Duggan 2010), while others simply reapply. If applying for DI benefits had a negative
effect on the employment of denied applicants, using the employment rate of denied
applicants could understate the average treatment effect of receiving disability insur-
ance for beneficiaries. In addition, in this case, any growth in the fraction of men
who are denied benefits would contribute to overall employment decline.
We overcome the limitations of these two approaches by identifying through ad-
ministrative records an additional control population – non-applicants with reported
work limitations – and by assessing the expansion of the DI system jointly with
employment rates for different applicant and age groups. Our results clarify that the
employment decline during the early 1990s can be explained by the concurrent DI
expansion only under the extreme assumption that the marginal beneficiaries would
have worked at rates comparable to non-applicants were they not receiving benefits.
In addition, when we extend the analysis past the period of rapid expansion of the DI
program into the late 1990s and early 2000s, we find that employment rates for men
with work limitations continued to decline, despite a slowdown in the growth rate of
DI. This alone suggests important other factors at work.
The next section briefly discusses main features of the DI program and major
policy changes over the last several decades. In Section 3, we develop and discuss the
decomposition. Section 4 provides a description of the main data sources used for
this study. It is followed by results (Section 5) and concluding remarks (Section 6).
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The federal government provides cash and medical benefits to the disabled through two
programs, the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program, which was enacted in
1956, and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, enacted in 1974. For both
programs, successful application requires the.
(…) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted, or can be expected to last, for a continuous period of at
least 12 months4.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the DI program was made available to a wider range of
people. In 1960, individuals under the age of 50 were made eligible for DI, and in 1965,
the definition of disability was liberalized to allow those without permanent disabilities
to qualify. In 1972, the waiting period required before an applicant for DI could start
receiving benefits was reduced from six to five months and benefit levels were
increased. By the mid-1970s, typical after-tax replacement rates reached 60 percent. In
addition, the introduction of the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) effect-
ively eliminated the work history requirement for those without either significant assets
or other sources of income. With the increase in both the availability and generosity of
the program, it is no surprise that DI rolls grew rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s,
reaching 2.9 million (3 percent of the working-age population) by 1980. Total benefits
paid out exceeded $15 billion, or 20 percent of benefits paid out for retirement. During
the 1970s, concern grew that the Social Security Administration (SSA) was losing con-
trol over the system and that many DI beneficiaries might not actually be eligible under
the law. The SSA responded both by refining the regulations guiding decisions, and by
negotiating agreements with various states. The consequences were quite dramatic.
Award rates fell from 48.8 to 33.3 percent between 1975 and 1980, with this decline
concentrated among states that had been more lenient in their decision making.
In 1980, Congress passed legislation designed to further tighten administrative con-
trol over the disability determination process by changing both the frequency and the
nature of medical eligibility reviews for disability beneficiaries. This legislation had a
discernible impact on administrative practice, with the number of new awards dropping
from 40 to 29 percent of all insured workers between 1980 and 1982, and the number of
benefit terminations increasing five-fold. In two years’ time, 25 percent of beneficiaries had
their cases reviewed and more than 40 percent of those reviewed had their benefits termi-
nated. These stricter practices led to questions about due process. Many who had their
benefits terminated during this period won reinstatement on appeal, and concern grew that
many of those who did not appeal their terminations were, in fact, eligible for benefits.
Widespread criticism led Congress to reverse course in 1984 with amendments that
had a profound effect on the standards used to evaluate DI eligibility. First, the burden
of proof was shifted onto the Social Security Administration to demonstrate that the
health of beneficiaries under review had improved sufficiently to allow them to return
to work. Second, a moratorium was imposed on reevaluations of the most troublesome
cases –those involving mental impairments or pain –until more appropriate guidelines
could be developed. Third, benefits were continued for those whose terminations were
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the claimant's own physician) by requiring that it be considered first, prior to the
results of an SSA consultative examination. Fifth, consideration had to be given to the
combined effect of all of an individual's impairments, regardless of whether any single
impairment was severe enough to qualify the individual for benefits. Finally, and
perhaps most important, the SSA substantially revised its treatment of mental illness,
reducing the weight given to diagnostic or medical factors and emphasizing the ability
of an individual to function in work or work-like settings.
Eligibility criteria were further liberalized in 1988 and then again in 1991 when the
SSA issued new rulings on pain that gave controlling weight to source evidence when
such opinions were supported by medical evidence and were not inconsistent with
other evidence in the case record. In addition, court opinions throughout the 1980s
and early 1990s tended to reinforce SSA’s shift in favor of source opinions (Social
Security Advisory Board 2001).
Figure 2 displays DI participation by age groups, expressed as percentages of all adult
men in each group, for the period 1970 to 2012. The figure clearly shows both the drop
in participation during the late 1970s and early 1980s and the strong increase in partici-
pation since the early 1990s, the latter of which was concentrated among men 45 years
or older and especially among men 55 or older.
3 Empirical methodology
We decompose the overall change in employment rates for men reporting a work
limitation into changes within and between application categories. Consider the following
decomposition of the employment rate of men with some health impairment at a time t = 1:
E1 ¼ Wb;1:Eb;1 þWd;1:Ed;1 þWn;1:En;1 ;
where the b, d, and n subscripts index beneficiaries, denied applicants, and non-
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Figure 2 DI Participation for Men, age 25-61, 1970-2012.
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applied for DI benefits but were rejected, and those with limitations who never applied
for benefits. In this decomposition we ignore men who are currently applying for DI
and former beneficiaries whose benefits were terminated. Both groups are small and do
not change the empirical results. The W's represent the fractions of the population in
each group that identify as having work limitations. The employment rate for t = 2 can
be decomposed in the same fashion:
E2 ¼ Wb;2:Eb;2 þWd;2:Ed;2 þWn;2:En;2;
Taking the difference between the two time periods and denoting changes by △
yields:
ΔE ¼ ΔWb  Eb þ ΔWd  Ed þ ΔWn  En þ Wb :ΔEb þ Wd :ΔEd þ Wn :ΔEn ð1Þ
where upper bars indicate averages taken over two periods. We can rewrite equation
(1) using the fact that ΔWn = −(ΔWb + ΔWd).
ΔE ¼ ΔWb  ð Eb − EnÞ þ ΔWd  ð Ed − EnÞ þ Wb :ΔEb þ Wd :ΔEd þ Wn :ΔEn: ð2Þ
Equation (2) is simply an accounting identity. However, if we assume that newlyinduced DI applicants would have had employment rates similar to those of non-
applicants had they not applied for DI, then the first two terms have an economic inter-
pretation. The first term ΔWb  ð Eb − EnÞ in the decomposition measures the effect
that the growth in the fraction of DI beneficiaries has on the employment decline of
those with work limitations, while the second term measures the effect that the growth
in the fraction of denied applicants has on the employment decline. The last three
terms represent within-group employment declines, which presumably reflect factors
affecting the employment of the disabled that are unrelated to program growth. The
extent to which any of these components are related to the increased availability of DI
benefits is not clear, and for the last component, which reflects employment changes
among those who never applied for DI benefits, it seems safe to assume that this
component does not reflect any behavioral effect of the program5.
If the increased availability of DI benefits during the 1990s has mainly affected men
who previously would have been working at rates comparable to non-applicants, then
equation (2) accurately measures the employment effect of the disability insurance pro-
gram during this time. It seems more plausible, however, that this form of decompos-
ition overstates the role of the DI growth, since it assumes that denied applicants and
beneficiaries would have the same employment rate as non-applicants if they had not
applied.
An alternative decomposition involves substituting out ΔWd instead of ΔWn in
equation (1). We obtain then:
ΔE ¼ ΔWb  ð Eb − Ed Þ þ ΔWn  ð En − Ed Þ þ Wb :ΔEb þ Wd :ΔEd þ Wn :ΔEn ð3Þ
In this case, the expansion of the DI program is weighted by the difference Eb − Ed
instead of Eb − En . The leading term of this decomposition reflects the effect of the ex-
pansion of DI on employment under two premises: (1) if marginal beneficiaries would
have had employment rates similar to denied applicants, had they not been receiving
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denied applicants.
These two decompositions help us interpret previous studies on the employment
effect of DI. The approach used by Bound and Waidmann (2002) and by Autor and
Duggan (2003) may be stated as estimating a type of the following specification:
ΔE ¼ βΔWb þ ε ð4Þ
If there is no correlation between ΔWb and other factors that affect the employmentdecline of men with work limitations then the OLS estimate β^ consistently estimates
the employment effect of DI expansion. However, if factors other than the increased
availability of DI benefits contributed to the employment decline, as seems plausible,
then ε and Wb in equation (4) will be negatively correlated, and the magnitude of β^ will
be biased upwards. Autor and Duggan (2003) address this issue by using instrumental
variables. They exploit changes in DI generosity due to shifts in the wage distribution.
An obvious issue is that their instrumental variable (IV) estimates are very imprecise
(the 95 percent confidence interval for men after 1984 includes the possibility that the
growth of DI had no effect on employment decline).
In contrast, studies that base inference on the behavior of denied applicants, such as
those by Bound (1989) and von Wachter et al. (2011) interpret the first term of (3) as
an upper-bound estimate of the effect of DI expansion on employment. This use of de-
nied applicants as a control group presupposes that the act of applying for DI benefits
has no effect on employment. The regression discontinuity (RD) approach used by
Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) and the IV approach used by Maestas et al. (2013)
manage to identify marginal beneficiaries. However, in both cases, the estimates identify
the effect of being awarded benefits on employment, which is conditional on having
applied for benefits. Thus, if applying per se has an effect on employment, these RD
and IV approaches will not identify the full affect of DI on employment.
4 Data and sample selection
Estimating the decompositions requires information about fractions of non-applicants,
denied applicants, and beneficiaries, as well as their respective employment rates. We
use data from the Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),
a nationally representative sample of individuals 15 years of age and older in the civilian
non-institutionalized population. Initiated in 1983, the SIPP interviews panels of re-
spondents once every four months for two to four years. When sampling a new SIPP panel,
the Census Bureau randomly assigns respondents into one of four rotation groups, with
each group interviewed one month after the previous one. When interviewed, respondents
are asked to provide information about the preceding four months, also called reference
months.
While the SIPP asks respondents about their employment situation and work limita-
tions, it does not contain information regarding applications to and outcomes for DI.
We used several administrative files to identify DI beneficiaries, denied applicants, and
non-applicants, and matched them to SIPP records using respondents’ Social Security num-
bers (SSN). Since people who disclose their SSN systematically differ from people who do
not, we reweight the original population weights provided by Census (Raghunathan, 2004)
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Master Earnings Records (MER) that contain yearly earnings records based on W-2 forms.
We restricted our sample to men ages 25 to 61 with a reported a work limitation, as
indicated by a positive response to this question in the SIPP:
“Does [insert name] have a physical, mental, or other health condition which limits
the kind or amount of work [insert name] can do”?
We use this measure to limit our sample because men who report no such limitation
are very unlikely to either apply for DI benefits or have them awarded. Although this
question asks about physical and mental health conditions, some studies suggest that
such general disability measures do not fully capture all people with mental health con-
ditions. Therefore, we likely select a population with more physical than mental health
conditions6.
We eliminate men younger than 25 because very few such individuals apply for DI,
and we eliminate those older than 61 because these individuals are eligible for Social
Security Retirement benefits. We also exclude men who have served in the armed
forces, and men who have applied or are currently applying for SSI but not for DI7.
With these restrictions, the fraction of men identified as having a work limitation re-
mains approximately constant through the years we examine (see Table 1). For an exact
decomposition, we also disregard current applicants and men whose DI benefits had
been terminated. Both groups are relatively small, and a more extensive decomposition
that includes these two groups does not change the results8.
The administrative records (SSN and MER) are not available for SIPP panels 1986 to
1989. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to later SIPP panels. Maag and Wittenburg
(2003) identified several problems with SIPP panels prior to 1996. Of interest here is
that interviewer prompting likely led to over-reporting of work limitations for all waves
except the first one. Therefore, we use only the first-wave data for pre-1996 panels. For
the 1996 and 2001 panels, we disregard the first waves due to apparent problems
following questionnaire redesign9. Finally, we select the fourth reference month for
each wave10, and use the last weeks' employment status, which corresponds to the
standard CPS employment measure. Details on administrative records and the sample
selection are contained in Appendix A.
We use three SIPP panel waves for our decomposition by age and applicant status:
1990, wave 1; 1996, wave 2; and 2004, wave 1. The fourth reference month of 1990,
wave 1 covers January through April 1990, just before the recession of 1990/1991 and
the expansion of the DI program started11. The fourth reference month of 1996, wave 2
covers July through October 1996, a time when the major expansion of the early 1990s
had subsided. To examine the second expansion during the late 1990s and early 2000s,Table 1 Percentage of men with work limitations
Men, 25-61 Men, 25-44 Men, 45-54 Men, 55-61
SIPP 1990, Wave 1 9.96 6.82 12.52 23.23
SIPP 1996, Wave 2 10.93 8.05 13.5 21.54
SIPP 2004, Wave 1 11.3 7.2 13.49 21.34
Note - Original person-month weights provided by Census have been used.
Source: SIPP matched to SSA administrative records.
Bound et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 9 of 232014, 3:11
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/11we use the 2004, wave 1 SIPP data, which cover January through April 200412. In
addition, we use all waves for these panels to discuss some of the findings of the
decomposition.5 Results
Table 2 presents population fractions of men in the three analyzed panel-waves by age
category and DI applicant status (non-applicant, beneficiary, and denied applicant). At
the beginning of 1990, slightly more than two thirds of men 25 to 61 years old with a
reported work limitation were non-applicants, 19 percent were beneficiaries, and 13.9
percent were denied applicants. Older men were more likely to receive DI benefits,
whereas the fraction of the population denied benefits was similar across age groups.
By 1996, the picture had changed quite dramatically. The fraction of non-applicants
had decreased by 10 percentage points to 56.9 percent, matched by a corresponding
increase of 10 percentage points, to 29.2 percent, in the fraction of beneficiaries. The
fraction of denied applicants remained stable 1990-1996 at around 14 percent13. The
increase in beneficiaries was concentrated among men 25 to 44 years old, with the percent-
age of beneficiaries 44 years or younger almost doubling from 1990 to 1996. However, in
absolute terms, the increase was highest for men 55 years and older, with DI participation
in this age category increasing from 29.7 percent to 42.6 percent. Comparing the 1996 panel
to the 2004 panel, we observe a further decline in the fraction of non-applicants to 51.8
percent, a 3.4 percentage point increase in the fraction of beneficiaries, and a 1.8 percentage
point increase in the fraction of denied applicants.
Table 3 shows corresponding employment rates. In 1990, the employment rate was
61.1 percent for non-applicants, 34.1 percent for denied applicants, and 5.7 percent for
beneficiaries14. Men age 25 to 44 years in 1990 had a similar total employment rate asTable 2 Population Fractions
Non-Applicants Denied Applicants Beneficiaries
Percentage N Percentage N Percentage N
SIPP 1990, Wave 1
Men 67.1 720 13.9 139 19.0 214
Men, 25-44 75.4 368 12.9 63 11.8 58
Men, 45-54 63.9 178 16.4 38 19.8 62
Men, 55-61 57.0 174 13.3 38 29.7 94
SIPP 1996, Wave 2
Men 56.9 904 13.8 224 29.2 475
Men, 25-44 64.9 456 13.3 99 21.8 158
Men, 45-54 54.3 286 15.0 74 30.7 157
Men, 55-61 44.0 162 13.5 51 42.6 160
SIPP 2004, Wave 1
Men 51.8 1000 15.6 293 32.6 615
Men, 25-44 58.5 408 17.3 120 24.2 158
Men, 45-54 51.6 343 15.9 101 32.6 214
Men, 55-61 42.4 249 12.9 72 44.7 243
Note - Corrected person-month weights have been used (see Appendix A). Source: SIPP matched to SSA
administrative records.
Table 3 Employment Rates
Total Non-Applicants Denied Applicants Beneficiaries
SIPP 1990, Wave 1
Men, 25-61 46.8 61.1 34.1 5.7
Men, 25-44 52.2 60.5 38.1 14.0
Men, 45-54 53.2 69.8 49.1 2.9
Men, 55-61 32.4 53.2 11.2 2.1
SIPP 1996, Wave 2
Men, 25-61 43.7 63.9 30.8 10.6
Men, 25-44 47.4 60.7 38.5 13.3
Men, 45-54 45.9 72.3 25.4 9.4
Men, 55-61 33.3 60.2 22.8 8.8
SIPP 2004, Wave 1
Men, 25-61 36.4 58.6 25.4 6.3
Men, 25-44 35.9 51.3 21.7 8.9
Men, 45-54 41.6 65.9 34.8 6.6
Men, 55-61 31.0 62.9 19.3 4.2
Source: SIPP matched to SSA administrative records.
Note - Corrected person-month weights have been used (see Appendix A).
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much lower for the younger than for the older group. The contrast for these two age
groups lies in the employment rate of beneficiaries, which is 14 percent for 25 to
44 year old men, but less than 3 percent for those 45 to 54 years. For the most part,
this age pattern for non-applicants and beneficiaries remains remarkably stable across
panel years, indicating that the difference in the employment rate of non-applicants
versus beneficiaries is not necessarily larger for younger than for older men15.
Table 4 displays characteristics of beneficiaries, denied applicants, and non-applicants
for each of the three panel-waves used in our analysis. The quantities we report are
age-adjusted to the age distribution of beneficiaries (see Appendix B for details). Table 4
includes the fraction of respondents who identify themselves in fair or poor health,
together with the average number of reported functional limitations and problems with
Activities of Daily Living (ADL). It also presents MER earnings information covering
10 years up to the interview year in the form of the percent with positive earnings in at
least 5 of these 10 years, and the average number of these 10 years with annual earn-
ings above $1,000 dollars (expressed in year 2000 values). We do not include past em-
ployment and earnings measures for DI beneficiaries because these are not meaningful.
Non-applicants tend to be better educated, more likely to be white, and less likely
to be black than either the denied applicants or beneficiaries. Fewer of the non-
applicants report being in poor or fair health and they cite fewer functional limita-
tions or ADL problems than do the other two groups. Denied applicants are on
average in better health than are beneficiaries. On average, non-applicants worked
for between seven and eight of the last 10 years and were very likely to have had posi-
tive earnings for at least half of those 10 years. Overall, even amongst those with
some kind of work limitation, non-applicants appear to be in better health and more
capable of work than those who applied, but were denied benefits. Across cohorts,
educational attainment appears to be rising for all three groups. We suspect that
Table 4 Demographic characteristics of applicant groups
Non-applicants Denied applicants Beneficiaries
SIPP 1990, wave 1
Percent with at least high-school 63.6 39.9 52.9
Percent with at least some college 31.7 16.9 15.8
Percent white 84.2 77.0 73.6
Percent black 13.2 19.3 24.6
Percent with poor or fair health 45.9 61.4 75.2
Average number of ADL problems 0.1 0.5 0.4
Average number of functional limitations 1.1 1.9 2.2
Percent working at least 5 of last 10 years 82.5 55.5
Average number of years with
earnings>$1000 in last 10 years
7.3 4.5
SIPP 1996, wave 2
Percent with at least high-school 76.1 65.4 62.6
Percent with at least some college 25.5 15.7 19.6
Percent white 80.5 79.7 80.3
Percent black 14.6 18.4 18.3
Percent with poor or fair health 39.7 62.4 71.4
Average number of ADL problems 0.2 0.3 0.7
Average number of functional limitations 0.9 1.4 2.1
Percent working at least 5 of last 10 years 80.9 65.5
Average number of years with
earnings>$1000 in last 10 years
7.2 5.2 6.2
SIPP 2004, wave 1
Percent with at least high-school 85.9 76.6 80.7
Percent with at least some college 39.1 26.0 34.7
Percent white 81.2 78.2 80.0
Percent black 11.5 16.9 13.6
Percent with poor or fair health 35.2 56.7 70.8
Average number of ADL problems 0.1 0.4 0.5
Average number of functional limitations 0.7 1.3 1.8
Percent working at least 5 of last 10 years 85.1 58.9
Average number of years with
earnings>$1000 in last 10 years
7.8 5.1
Notes: All percentages and averages are age adjusted using the age distribution of beneficiaries. Monetary values are expressed
in 2000 dollars. Health-related information is obtained from various topical modules. See Appendix B for details.
Source: SIPP matched to SSA administrative records.
Bound et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 11 of 232014, 3:11
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/11this trend simply reflects secular trends in educational attainment in the U.S.
working-age population.
Table 5 shows results for the first decomposition approach, shown in equation (2),
and the second decomposition approach, shown in equation (3). For the 1990-1996
comparison, the first decomposition suggests an estimated employment decline attrib-
utable to the increased availability of DI benefits ΔWb Eb − Enð Þð Þ that exceeds the
overall employment decline (ΔE) if all men 25 to 61 years of age are considered.
Separate decompositions by age groups reveal that employment rates declined during
that period only for men who were 25 to 54 years old, and that DI growth can explain
Table 5 Decompositions results
First approach ΔE Wb Eb ‐ En
 




Men, 25-61 −3.06 −5.54 0.02 1.75 1.19 −0.47
Men, 25-44 −4.79 −4.72 −0.09 0.09 −0.12 0.05
Men, 45-54 −7.26 −7.06 0.45 1.45 1.63 −3.72
Men, 55-61 0.84 −6.57 −0.08 3.52 2.42 1.55
1996-2004
Men, 25-61 −7.33 −1.80 −0.58 −2.87 −1.31 −0.78
Men, 25-44 −11.46 −1.07 −1.03 −5.78 −1.02 −2.57
Men, 45-54 −4.29 −1.16 −0.33 −3.39 −0.88 1.46
Men, 55-61 −2.27 −1.19 0.23 1.18 −2.03 −0.46
Second approach ΔE Wb Eb ‐ En
 




Men, 25-61 −3.06 −2.48 −3.04 1.75 1.19 −0.47
Men, 25-44 −4.79 −2.47 −2.34 0.09 −0.12 0.05
Men, 45-54 −7.26 −3.39 −3.22 1.45 1.63 −3.72
Men, 55-61 0.84 −1.49 −5.16 3.52 2.42 1.55
1996-2004
Men, 25-61 −7.33 −0.69 −1.69 −2.87 −1.31 −0.78
Men, 25-44 −11.46 −0.46 −1.64 −5.78 −1.02 −2.57
Men, 45-54 −4.29 −0.44 −1.05 −3.39 −0.88 1.46
Men, 55-61 −2.27 −0.31 −0.65 1.18 −2.03 −0.46
Notes: The table shows decomposition results for the period 1990-1996 and 1996-2004 using corrected person-month
weights as explained in Appendix A. The first approach refers to the decomposition shown in equation (1), the second
approach refers to the decomposition shown in equation (2). Source: SIPP matched to SSA administrative records.
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different using the second decomposition (Equation 3), which suggests that the
growth in DI can explain only about half of the overall employment decline for
25-54 year-old men.
Decompositions for the 1996-2004 comparison show a much larger overall employ-
ment decline – exceeding 10 percentage points for men 25 to 44 years old. No matter
which decomposition is used, these dramatic employment changes were not nearly
matched by a corresponding expansion of the DI program. For the 1996-2004 period,
the DI program can explain 30 to 50 percent of the overall employment decline. Even
more startling are the decompositions for the three different age groups. Especially for
men 25 to 44 years old, the portion of the employment decline attributable to the ex-
pansion of the DI program is at most 20 percent. Appendix C contains further sensitiv-
ity analyses for the SIPP data that support this finding.
6 Conclusion
This study has attempted to reconcile divergent findings concerning the employment
effect of the DI program. Using a decomposition strategy, we find that it is unlikely that
the growth in the fraction of DI beneficiaries during the early 1990s can fully explain
the employment decline during this period. This result is substantiated by the steady
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similar increases in the fraction of DI beneficiaries. It therefore seems likely that factors
other than the DI program itself have contributed to employment decline from 1990
to 2004. This is precisely the context in which the methods used by Bound and
Waidmann (2002) and Autor and Duggan (2003) are likely to exaggerate the causal role
played by DI in explaining the decline in the employment of men with work limitations.
This is not to say that the increased availability and generosity of disability benefits did
not contribute at all to the decline in the employment of men with a work limitation.
As long as some fraction of DI beneficiaries would have continued to work had such
benefits not been available to them, the growth in the availability/generosity of benefits
will have contributed to the drop in the employment of men with work limitations.
However, our tabulations suggest other factors were at work as well in explaining the
employment decline.
If the DI expansion does not explain the bulk of the drop in employment among
men with work limitations, we are still left with the question of what does explain
that trend. While answering this question is beyond the scope of this paper, we can
shed some light on directions for future research. For example, SIPP and CPS data
can be used to examine sources of household income for men with work limitations
who are neither working nor receiving disability benefits. For the families of these
men, the earnings of other household members represent an important source of
income as do benefits from various social insurance programs, such as veterans and
workers compensation benefits (Stewart, 2006). SIPP and CPS data provide no
evidence that these other social insurance programs have become more available or
more generous over the period in question –if anything, they show the reverse to be
true. Beyond this, the fraction of men with limitations who are married and living
with their spouse has fallen between 1990 and 2004, making it harder for these men
to rely on spousal earnings. Broadly, therefore, we see no evidence that men with
work limitations left the workforce during this period because of an increase in the
availability of alternative sources of income. However, there is substantial evidence
that there has been a secular decline in the demand of those with no more than a
high school education in the U.S. economy (Autor et al. 2008; Elsby & Shapiro,
2012). It seems plausible that these trends would have made it particularly difficult
for men with substantial health limitations to find gainful employment. Future re-
search will be needed to understand better how such demand changes have affected
people with disabilities.Endnotes
1Correspondingly, while employment rates for women increased during the same
time, employment rates for women with a work limitation remained constant.
2For a thorough discussion of alternative possible explanations for the decline in the
employment rates of those with reported work limitations see Burkhauser & Stapleton
(2003a). The various authors in this volume consider various alternative explanations,
including changes in demographic composition of the working age population with
disabilities, changes in the nature of work, changes in the severity of disabilities, and
the the unintended consequences of the Americans with Disabilities Act. In the final
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/11chapter to this edited volume, Burkhauser and Stapleton conclude that, while various
factors may have contributed to the decline in the employment rates of men identified
with work limitations, increases in the availability and generosity of federal disability
benefits probably played the largest role (Burkhauser & Stapleton, 2003b).
3Initial applications for disability insurance follow a five-stage procedure. Vocational
factors are considered at the fifth stage for those applicants who have not qualified for
disability insurance based on severe impairments. See Hu, et al. (2001) for a description
of the application process.
4See Title II of the Social Security Act, Section 223. [42U.S.C. 423], (d) (1) (A)
(http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/ssact/title02/0223.htm).
5With the expansion of DI, the size of the population of non-applicants will shrink.
Presumably this should mean the remaining non-applicants are more capable of doing
work. Thus, these compositional shifts should work in the direction of making this last
term positive. To the extent that this term is negative, it would seem to clearly point to
factors unrelated to the increased availability of DI contributing to the decline in the
employment of the men with work limitations.
6For instance, a study based on the National Comorbidity Survey suggests that gen-
eral disability measures used in surveys such as the SIPP or the Current Population
Survey undercount people with mental health conditions (Kessler et al. 2005).
7People can apply for DI and SSI for the blind and disabled simultaneously if they fulfill
the respective eligibility criteria. These dual applicant or beneficiaries are not disregarded.
8For the sample prior to disregarding current applicants and men who had received
disability insurance, the fraction of current applicants is generally between 2.5 and 5.5
percent for the waves considered, and does not show any trend. The fraction of men
those benefits have been terminated increases from about 1 percent to 3 percent be-
tween the 1990 and 2004 panel, which is consistent with a decrease of terminations
due to death and retirement, and an increase of terminations due to medical disqualifi-
cations since the late 1980s (Autor & Duggan, 2006).
9See Appendix A for a discussion of these problems.
10This is the month preceding the interview month and therefore likely to be the
least affected by recall bias regarding past employment status.
11Following the NBER business cycle dates, the recession of 1990/1991 started in July
1990.
12Results from the 2004 SIPP should be treated with caution, since the percentage of
men with work limitation is noticeably higher as compared to previous panels. If the
population with a work limitation in the 2004 panel is more healthy as compared to
the population with a work limitation in previous panels, then both the overall employ-
ment change and the role of DI growth would be understated. The overall bias for the
decomposition is therefore unclear.
13It appears that an increase in the application success probability since the mid-
1980s has mainly contributed to a stable fraction of denied applicants.
14As mentioned in Section 2, beneficiaries are not prohibited from working fully, but
may work to some extent, as long as their earnings do not exceed a certain threshold,
called the “Substantial Gainful Activity” amount.
15For instance, in 1990, the difference is 46.5 percent for men 25-44 years old, but
66.9 percent for men 44-54 years old and 51.1 percent 55-61 years old.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/1116If denied benefits at the initial determination process, applicants can ask for reconsider-
ation. If still denied benefits, they can further appeal the decision to an Administrative Law
Judge and an Appeal Board. See Benitez-Silva, et al. (1999) for a detailed analysis of the
appeal process.
17In practice, dates of filing might differ for same applications in these files. There-
fore, we matched records which were filed within 50 days. PHUS records are matched
to 831 or MBR records if the benefit begin date is within 100 days of the date an appli-
cation decision has been reached.
18Specifically, they are asked: “We have recorded that [person]'s health limits the kind
or amount of work [person] can do. Is that correct”?
19For these tabulations, we select men as described in Section 4, except selection
based on their SSN. Therefore, Table 6 presents accurate percentages for the sample
used for the decomposition prior to selection based on SSN disclosure.
20Leaving men who do not disclose their SSN in the sample is not an option since
they would be classified as non-applicants, even though some of them are beneficiaries
or denied applicants.
21We use the following age categories: 25-29 years, 30-34 years, 35-39 years,
40-44 years, 45-49 years, 50-54 years, and 55-61 years.
22In order to verify our supposition regarding the bias due to SSN disclosure, we
compared population fractions, employment rates, and decompositions using the ori-
ginal person-month weights and the corrected person-month weights. The correction
does increase the fraction of DI recipients and denied applicants, as well as decrease
the employment rates for all applicant groups. Furthermore, these changes tend to be
more severe for panels with a lower disclosure percentage. For the decomposition, we
find that using the corrected weights slightly reduces the role of the expansion of the
DI program in explaining the observed employment declines.
Appendix
A. Data selection, administrative records, and reweighting
Administrative records: Applications are identified through so-called 831 files. When a
person applies for DI, an 831 file is opened. It subsequently documents all application
stages up to the reconsideration stage16. We use 831 files from 1978 onwards, which is
the earliest year they are currently available. This restriction is likely to understate the
number of denied applicants slightly, especially for the earlier years of the analysis.
While 831 records provide accurate information on application dates and outcomes
of initial application and reconsideration, they do not record appeal decisions. However,
an increasing fraction of initially denied applications have been appealed. For instance,
in 2002, about one-third of all applications were decided through the appeal process.
Of these, more than three quarters were successful, as opposed to only 37 percent
successful initial applications (Szymendera, 2006). These successful appeals would be
misclassified as denial by 831 records.
In order to improve on the accuracy of the application information of the 831 files,
we augment them with the Master Beneficiary Records (MBR). The MBR contain
complete application information including appeals, but only for the latest disability
application. MBR records are matched to 831 files using dates of application. Further-
more, we use the Payment History Update System (PHUS) to identify successful
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tion on benefits received from 1984 onwards. They are matched to 831 files and MBR
records using benefit begin dates17. Aside from these administrative records, we also
match SIPP respondents to Master Earnings Records (DER). These are yearly earnings
records based on W-2 forms.
Work limitation: The SIPP contains a standard work limitation question: “Does
[person] have a physical, mental, or other health condition which limits the kind or
amount of work [person] can do”? Before the 1996 panel, people were asked this ques-
tion during the first wave, and then only for some subsequent waves which contained
health and disability modules. In these modules, people who had indicated a work limi-
tation in a previous wave were reminded of his or her affirmative response before the
question was asked again18. With the 1996 redesign, the work limitation question was
included in all core surveys, and people were not reminded of their previous response.
Maag and Wittenburg (2003) show that before the 1996 redesign, the prevalence rate
of work limitation increased within each panel over subsequent waves, whereas such a
trend is not visible for the 1996 panel. They hypothesize that those who indicated
having a work limitation in a previous wave are more likely to respond positively to the
question if they were reminded about their earlier response. Figure 3 replicates their
findings using SIPP panels 1984 to 2004 for men age 25 to 61. As can be seen, the
prevalence rates generally increase within each wave before the 1996 redesign. In
contrast, the 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP panels do not exhibit such a trend.
As a consequence of this reporting bias, it is plausible that people with work limita-
tions are relatively more healthy for later waves than for earlier ones. Consequently,
employment rates of people with work limitation are likely to be upward biased for
later waves of these panels. Figure 4 demonstrates the effect of the recall bias on
employment rates. As the fraction of men indicating a work limitation increases for
SIPP panels 1984-1993, so does their employment rate. In contrast, employment rates
remain stable across waves for later panels.
In order to circumvent the recall bias with respect to the work limitation question on
estimates of employment changes, we restrict our analysis to the first wave prior to the
1996 redesign. Figure 5 shows trends in the prevalence rates of men with work limita-
tions, using wave one, two, and four of SIPP panels between 1984 and 2004. It illus-
trates that the prevalence rate remains fairly stable between 1984 and 2004 when only
same waves are considered. Figure 6 depicts corresponding employment trends for
men with work limitations. The decline in the employment rate is similar to the CPS
based trend of Figure 1, although it seems to have started earlier.
We also disregard the first wave of the 1996 panel, since numerous changes imple-
mented in the 1996 SIPP redesign are likely to have affected data reporting for the first
wave (Maag & Wittenburg, 2003). As shown in Figure 3, the work limitation prevalence
rate is somewhat higher for the first wave of the 1996 SIPP panel than in subsequent
waves. This anomaly also appears for the 2001 SIPP panel. We suspect that similar
implementation issues affected that wave, and disregard it as well. Concerning the 2004
SIPP panel, we consider the first seven waves only, because administrative records were
only available until the end of 2005 when we conducted our study.
SSN disclosure: Table 6 reports the percentage of men, 25 to 61 years old, who did
and who did not disclose their SSN for selected waves of panels 1984 to 200419. The























































































Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 4
Figure 5 Percentage of men, age 25-61, who indicate a work limitation (waves 1, 2, and 4 for
various panels).
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for the SIPP 1996, and further to 76% for the SIPP 2004, wave 1. Moreover, the
percentage is only 62% for the SIPP 2001, wave 1, and declines to just above 60% for
subsequent waves of that panel. For that panel, the low percentage of disclosures was
apparently caused by Census' asking about respondents' SSN through telephone
interviews.
The decreasing SSN disclosure percentage poses two problems. First, since those who
do not report their SSN are subsequently disregarded, a lower disclosure percentage
reduces the final sample size20. Second, and more seriously, if men who disclose their
















Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 4
Figure 6 Employment rates of men, age 25-61, with work limitation (waves 1, 2, and 4 for
various panels).
Table 6 Disclosure of Social Security Numbers
Panel Wave SSN non-disclosure SSN disclosure
Percentage N Percentage N
1984 1 13.58 1578 86.42 10011
1990 1 7.9 1048 92.1 11590
1991 1 11.31 929 88.69 7562
1992 1 11.5 1236 88.5 10214
1993 1 12.26 1360 87.74 10239
1996 2 15.2 2971 84.8 16996
1996 3 15.08 2896 84.92 16535
1996 4 15.27 2837 84.73 15956
1996 5 15.17 2755 84.83 15383
1996 6 15.17 2649 84.83 14861
1996 7 15.24 2597 84.76 14396
1996 8 15.47 2625 84.53 14224
1996 9 15.47 2563 84.53 13971
1996 10 15.39 2517 84.61 13746
1996 11 15.49 2516 84.51 13600
1996 12 15.75 2578 84.25 13597
2001 2 37.86 6234 62.14 10280
2001 3 38.78 6178 61.22 9876
2001 4 38.64 6088 61.36 9685
2001 5 39.43 6122 60.57 9415
2001 6 39.51 6170 60.49 9343
2001 7 39.77 6138 60.23 9244
2001 8 39.94 6071 60.06 9046
2001 9 40.19 5940 59.81 8783
2004 1 23.65 5231 76.35 20021
2004 2 21.09 4374 78.91 19093
2004 3 20.19 4049 79.81 18428
2004 4 19.31 3813 80.69 18093
2004 5 18.23 3531 81.77 17840
2004 6 17.16 3281 82.84 17636
2004 7 16.06 3081 83.94 17471
Note - Data source is SIPP panels 1984-2004 matched to administrative records. Table entries are for men, 25-61 years
old. We exclude from the sample: (i) men who have been in the military; (ii) men who have applied or are currently
applying only for SSI; and (iii) men who are currently applying for DI/SSI or who were beneficiaries for DI. Details
concerning sample selection see Appendix A. Original person-month weights provided by Census have been used to
compute percentages.
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characteristics for selected waves of those who disclosed and those who did not disclose
their SSN, respectively. Men who disclosed their SSN are more likely to be better edu-
cated, married and employed than those who did not disclose their SSN. They also tend
to be more likely to report a work limitation in the 1990 SIPP panel, but they are less
likely to do so for the 2001 and 2004 panel. For a given panel, these differences in ob-
servable characteristics suggest that we would overstate the employment rate among all
application groups, and understate the fractions of beneficiaries and denied applicants,
Table 7 Demographic Characteristics by SSN Disclosure

















Age 40.58 40.11 0.58 40.04 40.94 −2.85 41.43 42.36 −3.11 39.81 42.98 −9.33
HS
graduates
82.56 83.83 1.07 83.09 88.87 79.10 88.05 90.04 14.93 79.63 91.92 658.93
Some
college
41.78 47.22 11.16 33.61 40.57 50.80 39.90 43.27 17.12 36.42 51.14 359.34
Married 63.10 68.73 13.95 58.53 68.00 101.56 61.93 66.39 32.23 50.46 69.02 629.16
Work
limited
7.04 9.38 5.91 9.41 9.43 0.00 9.29 8.33 4.01 12.68 8.93 65.90
Employed 84.89 87.01 3.50 84.09 88.33 42.01 82.57 86.67 48.72 77.96 86.81 253.77
Empl. if lim. 38.30 47.20 1.96 36.86 44.52 5.32 26.13 38.10 21.67 26.34 40.18 42.88
Note - Table entries are percentages except for the mean of age. Data source is SIPP panels 1984-2004 matched to
administrative records. Table entries are for men, 25-61 years old. We exclude from the sample: (i) men who have been
in the military; (ii) men who have applied or are currently applying only for SSI; and (iii) men who are currently applying
for DI/SSI or who were beneficiaries for DI. Details concerning sample selection see Appendix A. Original person-month
weights provided by Census have been used to compute percentages and means.
1We use the t-statistic (for mean differences) or the chi-square statistic (for proportions).
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employed. Moreover, since the percentage of men who disclose their SSN decreases
over subsequent panels, we would expect these biases to become more severe for later
panels. Consequently, we would obtain estimates for the increase in DI enrollment and
for the decline in employment rates which are too low. In order to correct for these
biases, we reweight the original population weights provided by Census to account for
non-random selection by SSN disclosure status (see for instance Ragunathan, 2004).
For that, we estimate weighted logit models of SSN disclosure for each panel separately.
We use the person-month weights provided by Census and include the same variables
as in Table 7, except for flexible age dummies21. We then divide the original weights by
the predicted values in order to obtain corrected weights. This procedure eliminates
the biases which result from selection on SSN if this selection, conditional on the
observable characteristics, is random22.B. Variables and calculations for demographic characteristics
Table 4 displays age-adjusted averages and percentage values, where we adjust for age
using the age distribution of beneficiaries. To this end, we first construct for weights
reflecting the fraction of beneficiaries in the following age groups: 25-34 years,
35-44 years, 45-54 years, and 55 to 61 years. We use corrected individual weights to
calculate these fractions (see Appendix A for details). In a second step, we use these
weights to calculate weighted averages or percentages for each applicant category (non-
applicants, denied applicants, and beneficiaries). We construct such weights separately
for each panel.
We use three variables from SIPP’s core survey: age, education, and race. We also use
several topical modules to include information about health and earnings. To calculate
the number of functional limitations and problems with Activities of Daily Living, we
use topical modules closest to the waves of our analysis. These are the third topical
module for the 1990 SIPP and the fifth topical module for the 1996 and 2004 SIPP. We
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son’s health in general is excellent, very good, good, fair or poor?”) to construct a binary
variable equals to one if the respondent’s health is fair or poor.
Aside from health-related variables, we use summary earnings from the Master Earn-
ings Records (MER) covering the interview year and the nine years before the interview
year. We use these 10 years of earnings to construct two variables. The first one is the
average number of these 10 years a respondent had earnings exceeding $1,000. The
second one is an approximation of whether the respondent is disability insured, which
is a binary variable equals to one if the respondent had positive earnings during at least
5 of the last 10 years.C. Further sensitivity analysis for the SIPP
In order to substantiate our finding that the DI program can explain little of the em-
ployment decline in the SIPP since the mid-1990s, we combine each 1996 wave (except
for the first) with each 2004 wave and carry out the first decomposition. We then
aggregate results into two sources of employment changes: the employment effect due
to changes in DI beneficiaries and denied applicants (the first two terms in Equation 2),
and changes in employment rates of non-applicants, beneficiaries, and denied appli-
cants (the last three terms of Equation 2). This procedure yields 77 decompositions for
the 1996-2004 comparison. For 66 out of 77 cases both the employment effect due to
changes in DI beneficiaries and denied applicants and changes in employment rates of
all applicant groups are negative. In eleven cases, the employment change is positive
while the DI growth term is negative. As argued earlier, the results for the 2004 panel
are likely to be confounded by much stronger changes in the percentage of men indi-
cating a work limitation (see footnote 12). For those cases for which both differences
are negative, the total employment effect never explains more than 50 percent of the
overall employment decline.
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